Free VA Accreditation Sample Questions (CC BY 4.0)

Answer: D.

Suspension temporarily withholds the authority to represent claimants, while cancellation terminates it (38 CFR 14.627(f), (t)). Think of it as a pause versus a full stop.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A is the mirror-image trap: it swaps the two definitions, and it catches almost everyone.

"(f) Cancellation means termination of authority to represent claimants. [...] (t) Suspension means temporary withholding of authority to represent claimants."

Source: 38 CFR 14.627(f), (t)

Answer: D.

Only one State organization may be recognized in each State, and only one tribal organization per tribal government (38 CFR 14.628(b)(1)-(2)). Meeting the requirements does not create extra slots.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: C tempts you by confusing meeting the requirements with there being no cap at all.

"Only one such organization may be recognized in each State. [...] Only one tribal organization may be recognized for each tribal government."

Source: 38 CFR 14.628(b)(1)-(2)

Answer: C.

Agents and attorneys must notify VA within 30 days of any change in their bar status (38 CFR 14.629(b)(4)). This duty is separate from the annual admission-and-good-standing filing.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: D is the real trap: a bar-status change cannot wait for the yearly paperwork.

"After accreditation, agents and attorneys must notify VA within 30 days of any change in their status in any jurisdiction in which they are admitted to appear."

Source: 38 CFR 14.629(b)(4)

Answer: D.

The Chief Counsel's qualification determination is a final adjudicative determination of an agency of original jurisdiction, appealable only to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (38 CFR 14.629(d)(2)(ii)).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: B is the classic trap, but accreditation denials do not skip straight to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.

"The determination of the Chief Counsel regarding the qualifications of a prospective service organization representative, agent, or attorney is a final adjudicative determination of an agency of original jurisdiction that may only be appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals."

Source: 38 CFR 14.629(d)(2)(ii)

Answer: D.

He was acting as the organization's representative under the 21-22, and VSO reps acting as such cannot take fees (38 CFR 14.636(b)). He could only charge if designated under 14.631 in his individual capacity as an agent.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A fools almost everyone: being an accredited agent does not override how you were appointed.

"Recognized organizations (including their accredited representatives when acting as such) and individuals recognized under § 14.630 of this part are not permitted to receive fees. An agent or attorney who may also be an accredited representative of a recognized organization may not receive such fees unless he or she has been properly designated as an agent or attorney in accordance with § 14.631 of this part in his or her individual capacity as an accredited agent or attorney."

Source: 38 CFR 14.636(b)

Answer: A.

A non-direct-pay fee agreement must be filed with OGC within 30 days of execution (38 CFR 14.636(g)(3)). Direct-pay agreements go to the AOJ instead, on the same deadline.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: B mixes up the two rules: direct-pay goes to the AOJ, but non-direct-pay goes to OGC.

"A copy of a direct-pay fee agreement, as defined in paragraph (g)(2) of this section, must be filed with the agency of original jurisdiction within 30 days of its execution. A copy of any fee agreement that is not a direct-pay fee agreement must be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within 30 days of its execution"

Source: 38 CFR 14.636(g)(3)

Answer: B.

With no continuous agent, the default is an equal split based on the number of eligible agents plus the claimant (38 CFR 14.636(i)(1)(ii)). Two eligible agents plus the claimant means three equal shares.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: C is the closest trap: it splits between the two agents but forgets the claimant's share.

"(i) In cases where a continuous agent or attorney is eligible for direct payment, the default shall be allocation of the fee to the continuous agent or attorney. (ii) In cases where paragraph (i)(1)(i) of this section does not apply, the default shall be an equal split of the fee based on the number of agents or attorneys who are eligible for direct payment plus the claimant or appellant."

Source: 38 CFR 14.636(i)(1)(i)-(ii)

Answer: D.

Expenses are not payable directly to the agent or attorney by VA out of benefits due to the claimant (38 CFR 14.637(b)). The fee agreement can arrange reimbursement from the claimant, but VA never pays expenses out of past-due benefits.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A borrows the real 20 percent cap, but the cap measures fees, not expenses, and does not authorize VA to pay them.

"Whether such an agent or attorney will be reimbursed for expenses and the method of such reimbursement is a matter to be determined by the agent or attorney and the claimant or appellant in the fee agreement filed with the Office of the General Counsel or the agency of original jurisdiction under § 14.636 of this part. Expenses are not payable directly to the agent or attorney by VA out of benefits determined to be due to a claimant or appellant."

Source: 38 CFR 14.637(b)

Answer: A.

Once you file one review option, you cannot file a different option on the same issue while that review is pending final adjudication (38 CFR 3.2500(b)). To switch lanes, withdraw the pending request first under 3.2500(d).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: B sounds reasonable, but you cannot run two review lanes at once on the same issue.

With regard to the adjudication of a claim or an issue as defined in § 3.151(c), a claimant who has filed for review under one of the options available under paragraph (a) of this section may not, while that review is pending final adjudication, file for review under a different available option.

Source: 38 CFR 3.2500(b)

Answer: A.

A claimant may withdraw a supplemental claim or HLR request any time before VA renders a decision on the issue, and the withdrawal is effective the date VA receives it (38 CFR 3.2500(d)).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: B invents a 60-day window and a mailing-date rule; neither is in the regulation.

A claimant may withdraw a supplemental claim or a request for a higher-level review at any time before VA renders a decision on the issue. [...] The withdrawal will be effective the date VA receives it.

Source: 38 CFR 3.2500(d)

Answer: D.

The supplemental claim arrived more than a year after the denial notice, so continuous pursuit is broken (38 CFR 3.2500(h)(2)). The effective date cannot be earlier than June 3, 2025, the date VA received the supplemental claim.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A reaches for continuous pursuit, but it only preserves the original filing date when the supplemental claim arrives within one year of the notice.

Except as otherwise provided in this section, for supplemental claims received more than one year after the date on which the agency of original jurisdiction issues notice of a decision or the Board of Veterans' Appeals issued notice of a decision, the effective date will be fixed in accordance with the date entitlement arose, but will not be earlier than the date of receipt of the supplemental claim.

Source: 38 CFR 3.2500(h)(2)

Answer: D.

Higher-level review is a closed-record review: the record is limited to what was of record when the AOJ issued notice, and the adjudicator may not consider additional evidence (38 CFR 3.2601(f)). New evidence belongs in another lane, like a supplemental claim.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A feels like it should work, but attaching a new opinion to an HLR request does not get it considered.

The evidentiary record in a higher-level review is limited to the evidence of record as of the date the agency of original jurisdiction issued notice of the prior decision under review and the higher-level adjudicator may not consider additional evidence.

Source: 38 CFR 3.2601(f)

Answer: B.

Under 38 CFR 3.400(o)(2), the effective date is the earliest date the increase is factually ascertainable, when the complete claim arrives within a year of that date. The May 15, 2025 record pins the increase, and the January 12, 2026 claim is within the year.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A tempts you because the claim date is the default in so many effective-date rules, but 3.400(o)(2) looks back to when the increase was ascertainable.

Earliest date as of which it is factually ascertainable based on all evidence of record that an increase in disability had occurred if a complete claim or intent to file a claim is received within 1 year from such date, otherwise, date of receipt of claim.

Source: 38 CFR 3.400(o)(2)

Answer: B.

For a service-connected death after separation, the claim arrived within a year of death, so the effective date is the first day of the month of death: March 1, 2025 (38 CFR 3.400(c)(2)).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A uses the exact death date, but VA backdates to the first of the month.

Service-connected death after separation from service (38 U.S.C. 5110(d), Pub. L. 87-825) (§§ 3.4(c), 3.5(b)). First day of the month in which the veteran's death occurred if claim is received within 1 year after the date of death; otherwise, date of receipt of claim.

Source: 38 CFR 3.400(c)(2)

Answer: A.

Under 38 CFR 3.400(c)(4)(ii), a child's DIC award is effective the first day of the month entitlement arose if the claim is received within a year after entitlement; otherwise, the date of receipt.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: B uses the receipt date as a universal default, but children get a one-year grace period.

Child (38 U.S.C. 5110(e), Pub. L. 87-835). First day of the month in which entitlement arose if claim is received within 1 year after the date of entitlement; otherwise, date of receipt of claim.

Source: 38 CFR 3.400(c)(4)(ii)

Answer: A.

A direct service connection claim filed within a year of separation gets the day following separation as the effective date (38 CFR 3.400(b)(2)(i)). Entitlement arose in service and the claim was timely, so the award starts July 1, 2025.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: C is one day too early: the statute says the day FOLLOWING separation.

(2) Disability compensation: (i) Direct service connection (§ 3.4(b)). Day following separation from active service or date entitlement arose if claim is received within 1 year after separation from service; otherwise, date of receipt of claim, or date entitlement arose, whichever is later.

Source: 38 CFR 3.400(b)(2)(i)

Answer: D.

If VA receives the complete application form within a year of the intent to file, the complete claim is considered filed as of the intent-to-file date (38 CFR 3.155(b)). February 20, 2026 is within a year of March 10, 2025.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A is the main trap: the receipt date of the complete claim does not set the filing date when it arrives within a year of the intent.

If VA receives a complete application form prescribed by the Secretary, as defined in paragraph (a) of § 3.160, appropriate to the benefit sought within 1 year of receipt of the intent to file a claim, VA will consider the complete claim filed as of the date the intent to file a claim was received.

Source: 38 CFR 3.155(b)

Answer: C.

Once VA receives a complete claim, it adjudicates any ancillary benefits that arise from the decision, such as SMC under 3.350, whether or not the claimant asserted them (38 CFR 3.155(d)(2)).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A is the main trap: ancillary benefits like SMC do not need their own separate claim.

Once VA receives a complete claim, VA will adjudicate as part of the claim entitlement to any ancillary benefits that arise as a result of the adjudication decision (e.g., entitlement to 38 U.S.C. Chapter 35 Dependents' Educational Assistance benefits, entitlement to special monthly compensation under 38 CFR 3.350, entitlement to adaptive automobile allowance, etc.). The claimant may, but need not, assert entitlement to ancillary benefits at the time the complete claim is filed.

Source: 38 CFR 3.155(d)(2)

Answer: D.

For records from a Federal department or agency like SSA, VA must make as many requests as necessary and stops only if it concludes the records do not exist or further efforts would be futile (38 CFR 3.159(c)(2)).

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: A states a limited-request standard that does not apply to federal agencies.

VA will make as many requests as are necessary to obtain relevant records from a Federal department or agency. [...] VA will end its efforts to obtain records from a Federal department or agency only if VA concludes that the records sought do not exist or that further efforts to obtain those records would be futile.

Source: 38 CFR 3.159(c)(2)

Answer: B.

Under 38 U.S.C. 5100(1), a claimant is any individual applying for, or submitting a claim for, any benefit under the laws administered by the Secretary. No veteran-status or representation requirement.

Why the tempting wrong answer fails: Limiting claimant to veterans feels natural, but the chapter 51 definition is deliberately broad.

The term “claimant” means any individual applying for, or submitting a claim for, any benefit under the laws administered by the Secretary.

Source: 38 U.S.C. 5100(1)